Abstract. The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) was proposed in 1991 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology to provide an appropriate core for applications requiring digital signatures. Undoubtedly, many applications will include this standard in the future and thus, the foreseen domination of DSA as a legal certification tool is sufficiently important to focus research endeavours on the suitability of this scheme to various situations. In this paper, we present six new DSA-based protocols for:
Introduction
There is no doubt that the proposal of the DSA [1] as a Federal Standard will make this scheme widely accepted and used for certifying the integrity of messages and documents. Electronic passports, ID-cards, driving licenses and other DSA-based purses are thus expected to join (and partially replace) a whole gamut of passive devices used today in telephony and banking.
However, many potential applications will certainly remain beyond of reach because of the difficulty of manipulating big-numbers in portable devices and although constant improvements of silicon technologies may solve the majority of these problems, the price of crypto-dedicated chips will most certainly be the new barrier to jump over during the next decade.
Nevertheless, DSA is aimed to be only one layer in more complex systems which will generally include phone lines, powerful (but potentially hostile) terminals and storage or compression facilities which might be of some help in the processing of DSA signatures.
This paper presents a family of DSA-compatible protocols precisely designed to simplify the signer and the verifier's work whenever possible. For instance, one of our methods saves 480 multiplications per signature by batch-processing simultaneously large sets of signatures, a second algorithm compresses sets of DSA transactions into shorter archive signatures and two other protocols avoid the computations of modular inverses and exponentials to the signer.
All these schemes combine in a natural way full DSA compatibility and flexible trade-offs between computational complexity, transmission overheads and key sizes.
DSA Batch Verification
The parallel verification of many signatures in a single algorithmic operation might be of big help in many practical applications: banks will collect sequentially considerable volumes of transactions but compensate them at once, tollhighway machines will process collectively many electronic tokens at rush-hour peaks and pay-TV operators might be interested in satisfying large numbers of customers in a relatively short time.
The algorithms presented in this section are provably as secure as the original DSA but much faster as they replace multiplications modulo p by additions modulo q.
For simplicity, all protocols will be given for a single signer as their extension to a community of users (same public moduli but different public-keys) is straightforward but requires heavier notations.
Interactive batch
The signature collection protocol is:
for i = 1 to n 1. The signer picks k i ∈ R GF * (q) and sends λ i = g ki mod p; 2. The verifier replies with an e-bit message randomiser b i ; 3. and the signer sends s i = SHA(mi|bi)+xλi ki mod q.
The batch-verification criterion (with "cut & choose" in case of failure) is:
wiλi mod q mod p where w i = 1 si mod q and the verifier replaces {λ i , s i , b i , m i } by the DSA triples
This scheme is essentially as fast as a single DSA verification (3(n − 1) log 2 (q) ≈ 480n modular multiplications are saved) and provably secure: Assume that j − 1 messages were signed, and denote:
wiλi mod q mod p,
If, at this point, a cheater can produce a λ j such that he can later solve (by the means of some cryptanalysis C(α, β, λ j , m j , b j , p, q, g, y) = s j ) the equation γ sj ≡ g SHA(mj |bj ) y λj mod q mod p then he can pick, by his own means, any random couple {b 1 , b 2 }, find C(α, β, λ j , m j , b i , p, q, g, y) = s j,i for i = 1, 2 and compute directly (see appendix 1):
which satisfies gx = y mod p and breaks DSA.
Although e ≈ 40 is far sufficient for most applications, larger message randomisers will not handicap the algorithm significantly (the only overhead may be an additional SHA round 1 ), on the other hand, the b i s should not be too small (e ≤ 16 bits) as if the cheater can guess in advance (before sending λ j ) two b i values (or open simultaneously a new "for i" session before the last one finished) a linear-algebraic attack (to appear in the full paper), can make the verifier accept all the previously sent signatures.
Probabilistic batch
Although interactively-collected signatures are DSA-compatible and provably secure, the mandatory successiveness in the first phase of the protocol makes the signatures batch-verifiable only by the collector (others have to trust him or use the NIST's method).
The following scheme avoids the interactiveness at the price of some more computations:
for i = 1 to n, the signer:
mod q; 2. and sends {λ i , s i , m i } to the verifier.
To verify {λ i , s i , m i } i=1,...,n :
1. pick n pairwise relatively prime equation randomisers
biwiλi mod q mod p
and replace {λ
The security of this scheme is guaranteed by:
The following statements are equivalent:
1. There is an efficient algorithm
There is an efficient algorithm which breaks DSA.
Dividing the formulae:
we get: λ 2b ≡ gb w2SHA(m2) mod q yb w2λ2 mod q mod p andb th roots mod p can be taken at both sides (asb has an inverse modulo q) to see that {m 2 , s 2 , r 2 = λ 2 mod q} passes the sequential DSA test.
An immediate consequence of theorem 1 (which can be further generalised) is: Lemma 1. If the b i s are pairwise relatively prime, strictly smaller than q and picked in a set A then:
The most natural A is the set of primes smaller than a certain bound (for instance, Ω({primes ≤ 7927}) ∼ = 10 −6 is suitable for most applications), but the cardinality of A can be optimised by the following technique:
Denote C = {c first primes} and let f (c) be such that S
is maximal. Characteristic instances of the three verification strategies (sequential, interactive and probabilistic batch for lemma 3 and e = 20) are compared in table 1 where all costs are given for n signatures.
Compressing DSA Signatures
DSA signatures are meant to be legal proofs and should thus be archived during a certain time. Taking as an everyday example the case of cash dispensing machines, each money withdrawal operation makes the terminal generate a short debit certificate (32 bytes) which is kept for future trace by the bank during four 2 S m n denotes the Stirling numbers of the 2 nd kind (that is, the # of partitions of a set of n objects to m classes). years. Although public key techniques are ideally tailored for such situations (attacks against terminals are of no help for forging cards), it is striking to observe that the DSA "protection layer" may turn to be as big as the protected message itself. Whilst messages may contain redundancies and admit a whole gamut of compression solutions, DSA signatures (based on k and x, both of which are random and unknown to the archivist) are,à priori, impossible to compress since log(x) + log(k) ≈ log(s) + log(r).
Coming back to our bank example, and assuming that the card-holder comes to the bank office from time-to-time (even once a year), one can imagine a signeraided compression scheme in which the bank will take advantage of the visits to re-send to the card a set of signatures (of which the signer kept no trace), the card will verify these and once recognised (as generated with its x), concatenate all the corresponding messages and put a single signature on the whole. Unfortunately, this solution suffers from the heavy disadvantage of forcing the card to perform a number of DSA verifications which might be too lengthy and unsuited to a real-life context. However, the card knows more than the verifier about its own signatures, namely, knowing x, the signer can easily reverse the steam and compute k. Thus, by a proper redundancy in k, the card can recognise its signatures with a minimal effort (a couple of multiplications).
Practically, we propose to build:
where k ≤ 3 q 2 is a shorter random picked by the signer during the generation of the signature and m the signed message.
The compression protocol (now being implemented in an Asian banking application) is: Note that the 2/3-sized random was chosen to reach an optimal birthdayparadox security (≈ 2 53 for q ≈ 2 160 ).
1/k-less Signatures
For generating or verifying DSA signatures, one must posses an algorithmic tool for computing modular inverses. The NIST recommends Euclid's algorithm which is fast and suitable to software applications but becomes of no interest when the basic tool at one's command is a ready-to-use modular multiplier ("black-box" implementing the operation a × b mod n). This observation may well explain the fact all today's DSA smart-card prototypes (three different crypto-engines and five different companies! 3 ) use the identity: x −1 = x q−2 mod p to compute modular inverses.
4
In this section we propose a simpler solution which eliminates completely 1/k from the signature generation process. The idea consists in hiding k behind a random blinder d which disappears automatically during the verification. The proposed protocol is: and its security is guaranteed by the fact that any would-be cryptanalysis C(m, p, q, g, y) = {r, a, b} will break the original DSA by post-calculating s = a/b mod q. 
Shorter Self-certifying Primes
In memory-restricted environments (like smart-cards or other portable electronic tokens), key size is an influential parameter in the favour of a given algorithmic solution. The standard specifies a "wild" prime generation scheme (meant to avoid trapdoor moduli) which outputs at least 844 bits: p and q (respectively 512 and 160 bits long) and a certificate of proper prime generation (172 bits at minimum). Our approach for reducing the size of these data (by about 60%) combines several advantages:
1. q is simply the 160 most significant bits of p. 2. The certificate of proper prime generation is embedded into p as well. 3. The "wildness" of our prime generation procedure still avoids the generation of trapdoor primes.
The algorithm is:
Steps 1 to 4. (See appendix 2). Identical to the NIST key generation algorithm with a 160-bit Seed.
If the 32-bit zero pattern in p (counter ) turned to 7FFFFFFF 16 go to Step 1.
Step 9.
If p is composite go to Step 7. and an output example (Seed and q are taken from the NIST's DSA example-list) is: q = b20db0b101df0c6624fc1392ba55f77d577481e5 Seed = d5014e4b60ef2ba8b6211b4062ba3224e0427dbd counter = 0000000c ''tail'' = fdb18bdb74205335fa5302b67a7db7c08a12ad41 which concatenation gives: p = b20db0b101df0c6624fc1392ba55f77d577481e5|d5014e4b60ef 2ba8b6211b4062ba3224e0427dbd|0000000c|fdb18bdb7420533 5fa5302b67a7db7c08a12ad41
6 Use & Throw DSA signatures A well-known feature of the DSA, inherited from its ancestors El-Gamal [5] and Schnorr [10] , is the possibility to pre-compute r and the inverse of k before the message is known. Then, the effort needed to produce s from m is negligible. This section introduces a coupon-based protocol exploiting this property for helping the signer to generate signatures very quickly. In our model, a trusted authority sends public data packets (Use & Throw coupons) to the signer who stores them for future use. Each coupon is only 28-byte long and enables its owner to generate one DSA signature (if a coupon is used twice, the signer's x is revealed). Two noteworthy advantages of this method are that the signer has only to posses x and q (the storage of g and p, which represents 1024 bits at minimum, can be avoided) and only a couple of multiplications is needed to transform a coupon to a signature. The system is based on a retro-calculation of k from an easily compressible inverse and is ideally suited to electronic-purse applications where card-holders interact periodically with a trusted authority for loading money into their purses (refreshing the coupon's reserve). This scheme was implemented on a 68HC05-based prototype 5 which generates s in less than 150 ms (4 MHz clock) and can contain up to 91 coupons in EEPROM. A heavy-duty version (now under development) will be 30% faster and tailored to contain 279 coupons.
Note that when Montgomery's algorithm [8] is used (let Q = 2 −size(q) mod q), the signer can shortcut his calculations by using the key: x = xQ −1 mod q if the authority compensates:
The coupon-owner will then compute s by two Montgomery rounds (instead of four):
The signature is still DSA-compatible and the storage of 4 size(q) mod q (20 bytes normally needed for converting results from Montgomery's format to the conventional number system) has been avoided.
⇒ Note that coupons can be reduced to exactly 20-bytes if only one new common J is generated during each loading session and inverses are diversified by 1/k i = SHA(J|x|i) where i is the coupon's number.
The general electronic check concept (see for instance [4] ) can apply more or less efficiently (size of the check and the number of multiplications required to produce a signature) to a big variety of cryptosystems. We incite the reader to examine and/or modify the relevant bibliography for obtaining an optimal suitability to a given practical situation.
Conclusion
We showed that relatively simple considerations may greatly accelerate the processing of DSA signatures. The main characteristics of the algorithms presented in this article (which can be easily adapted to suit different environnements or even other signature schemes like the Brickell-McCurley [3] and GuillouQuisquater [6] 
A Security Proof (Interactive Batch)
Denoting by E(i) the formulae γ sj,i ≡ g SHA(mj |bi) y λj mod q mod p for i = 1, 2, we can divide E(1) by E(2), extract γ from the resulting equality and replace it back into E(1) which becomes gx = y mod p.
B The Digital Signature Algorithm
The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), proposed in August 1991 by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, is a DLP-based cryptosystem which parameters are:
and L mod 64 = 0. 2. A prime q such that 2 159 < q < 2 160 and p − 1 is a multiple of q. 3. A number g = h (p−1)/q mod p for some h. 4. A 160-bit secret-key x and an L-bit public-key y defined by the relation:
The integers p, q and g are system parameters and can be public and/or common to a group of users. A 160-bit random k, used by the signer, must be kept secret and regenerated for each signature.
In order to sign a message m (hashed value of a primitive file M ), the signer computes the signature {r, s} by: r = (g k mod p) mod q and s = m + xr k mod q
To check {r, s}, the verifier computes: w = 1 s mod q, u 1 = mw mod q and u 2 = rw mod q
And compares if r = (g u1 y u2 mod p) mod q to accept or reject the signature.
Assuming no algorithmic sophistications § , the resources necessary for the implementation of the DSA are: And the complete process is briefly summarised by the following figure: {q, p, g, y, M} in public domain The NIST suggests to generate p and q with the following algorithm:
Step 1. Choose an arbitrary sequence of g (≥ 160) bits and call it Seed.
Step 2. Set: q = (SHA(Seed ) ⊕ SHA(Seed + 1 mod 2 g )) ∨ (2 L−1 + 1).
Step 3. Use a robust ¶ primality testing algorithm to test whether q is prime.
Step 4. If q composite, go to Step 1. § Some of which [2] may spectacularly divide all the 512-bit figures by about 6 but these tools apply exactly in the same manner to our schemes. The important point is the ratio between the protocols which remains constant whatever exponentiation strategy is used. ¶ A robust primality test algorithm is one where the probability of a non-prime passing the test is < 2 −80 .
